The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has uncovered increasingly sophisticated methods allegedly being used by terrorist financiers to conceal illicit funds, including the use of bank accounts opened in the names of women, disguised phone numbers, coded transaction descriptions and online crowdfunding platforms.

The revelations are contained in the NFIU’s 2025 annual report, which provides insight into emerging techniques being deployed to move, conceal and distribute funds linked to terrorist activities in Nigeria.

According to the report, some male terrorist commanders and logistics coordinators allegedly control accounts registered in the names of their wives, sisters and female associates in an attempt to distance themselves from suspicious financial transactions.

The agency described the practice as a form of “identity laundering”, in which individuals who are actually controlling the funds remain hidden behind accounts belonging to other people.

“Terrorist financiers are opening bank accounts in women’s names while male commanders and logistics managers secretly control them,” the report stated.

The NFIU said the strategy could exploit social and cultural assumptions that women are less likely to attract suspicion from financial investigators.

“ They exploit cultural norms that make women less likely to be suspected by authorities, using wives, sisters, or female associates as fronts to distance illicit funds from the true operatives,” the agency said.

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Women may not know how accounts are being used

The intelligence unit cautioned that not every woman whose account is allegedly used in such schemes is necessarily aware of the transactions.

Some account holders, it said, may have little or no knowledge of the volume, origin or destination of funds passing through their accounts.

According to the report, however, terrorist financiers may retain control of critical banking instruments, including ATM cards, mobile banking credentials and personal identification numbers.

Such arrangements can make the legitimate account holder appear to be the person conducting transactions while concealing the identity of the actual operator.

The NFIU said the technique creates additional difficulties for financial institutions and investigators attempting to establish the beneficial owner of suspicious funds.

Disguised phone numbers used to break financial trails

The report also identified the misuse of telephone numbers and SIM cards as another emerging method of concealing financial transactions.

According to the NFIU, facilitators may use phone numbers for mobile banking, transaction alerts and account authentication that are not registered to the actual account holder or beneficiary.

The agency said these could include pre-registered SIM cards, numbers registered to deceased persons or SIM cards belonging to unrelated individuals.

It said such arrangements could make it difficult for investigators to connect a suspicious financial transaction to the person ultimately controlling the funds.

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The NFIU noted that the tactic could circumvent the security relationship between SIM registration and Bank Verification Numbers (BVNs), thereby weakening the audit trail available to investigators.

“When a transaction is flagged, investigators trace the phone to an unrelated person, letting the real facilitator stay anonymous and continue operations,” the report stated.

Terrorist cells use coded descriptions for transactions

Another technique identified by the financial intelligence agency involves the use of coded and highly specific descriptions attached to financial transactions.

The NFIU said terrorist cells, including those linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), could use detailed transaction narrations to coordinate payments for logistics while making the transactions appear less suspicious.

According to the agency, payments from a single source to multiple recipients may contain apparently ordinary descriptions that actually function as an internal accounting system.

The use of such descriptions, the report said, could allow terrorist networks to track payments and recipients without explicitly revealing the nature of the underlying activity.

The NFIU also warned that facilitators could employ innocuous expressions, alphanumeric combinations, secret codes and different languages to evade automated financial-monitoring systems.

“Facilitators use this coded language, often switching languages to evade banks’ automated keyword filters that flag terms like ‘Jihad,’ ‘Arms,’ or ‘Boko’,” the report said.

The agency said the practice could obscure the purpose of transfers and allow illicit payments to continue without immediately triggering automated alerts.

Crowdfunding emerges as another potential channel

Beyond conventional banking, the NFIU identified crowdfunding and international remittance platforms as potential channels for terrorist financing.

The agency outlined a four-stage model in which a foreign-based facilitator could establish an online fundraising campaign presented as humanitarian assistance, educational support or another legitimate cause.

The campaign could then be promoted through social media, directing contributors to payment platforms or designated bank accounts.

Rather than relying on a small number of large transactions, the NFIU said hundreds of individuals could contribute relatively small amounts.

According to the report, contributions ranging from about $50 to $500 could be sufficiently small to avoid triggering some automated anti-money laundering (AML) alerts.

The funds could subsequently be consolidated in a central or “master” account before being redistributed through international money-transfer operators and remittance applications.

Money mules allegedly help move funds

The NFIU said the next stage could involve transferring the money to intermediaries in Nigeria who serve as money mules.

Among those potentially recruited, according to the report, are students, small-business operators and relatives.

These intermediaries could receive funds through their bank or mobile-money accounts before converting the money into cash, purchasing goods with legitimate civilian applications or transferring it onward through mobile banking channels.

The agency said the final recipients could include individuals responsible for terrorist logistics and field operations.

The use of intermediaries, the NFIU explained, creates additional layers between the original source of funds and the individuals ultimately benefiting from them.

Exploiting legitimate financial infrastructure

The NFIU’s findings point to an evolving challenge for Nigeria’s financial intelligence and counter-terrorism authorities.

Rather than relying exclusively on traditional cash movements or obviously suspicious accounts, terrorist financing networks are increasingly alleged to be exploiting legitimate financial infrastructure, telecommunications systems, digital platforms and ordinary social relationships.